historical precedent? We present the results of our empirical inquiry into the treatment of noneconomic compensatory damages by the courts from 1800-1900. Using 1,175 tort cases from this era, we show that, notwithstanding constant reiteration ofjury discretion over damages, courts tightly controlled awards. In fact, no case prior to 1900 permitted a noneconomic compensatory damages award exceeding $450,000 in current dollars. Logistic regression results reveal that an increase in total monetary damages is positively and significantly related to the probability of reversal when noneconomic damages were claimed, and that comparability review decreases the probability of reversal.
I. INTRODUCTION
In State Farm v. Campbell,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause imposes limits on punitive damages. It is obvious what led the Supreme Court to rein in punitive damages. They are imposed by a random group of citizens (jurors or judges), frequently on foreign entities (such as out of state corporations), in the absence of any objective measure.
2 It is as though the law of State A authorized a small group of its citizens (judge or jury) to take the property of the citizens of other states (e.g., the shareholders in corporations) and to transfer that property to one of their own, where the primary check on their behavior was their own internal sense of propriety. 3 Most juries and judges demonstrated constrained good sense in their damages verdicts; however, a number of cases returned damage awards, and punitive damages awards in particular, that were exorbitant. 4 Many of these were reduced by courts through excessiveness review and other means, but a number were not.
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State Farm v. Campbell provided concrete guidance on the reasonable ranges for punitive damages awards through the now famous requirement that, typically, punitive damages cannot exceed a single-digit multiplier of 'See, e.g., David Baldus, John C. MacQueen & George Woodworth, Improving Judicial Oversight ofJury Damage Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 1109 Rev. , 1115 Rev. (1995 .
'For a considerable period, this was the only required check so far as federal law was concerned. Many states patrolled punitive damages for excessiveness, but punitive damage assessment was viewed until recently as a matter of legislative or common-law grace of the various states rather than mandated by any constitutional principles. 4 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 Emory L. J. 1405 (2004) (providing an analysis of 64 punitive damages awards of at least $100 million, most of which have been appealed, but few have been reversed). See also Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2004) (using the same blockbuster cases, the authors find that juries are more likely to award punitive damages than are judges; juries award higher levels of punitive damages; and juries are largely responsible for extremely large punitive damage amounts; juries also tend to award higher compensatory damages, which in turn will often boost the punitive damages award). J. 1405 (2004) (noting that most of the awards studied-punitive damages awards of $100 million since 2004, or 64 awards-were appealed, but that the reversal of these punitive damages awards is the exception rather than the role; Figure 1 illustrates that 39 of the 64 cases were affirmed; id. at 1452). the compensatory damage award. 6 Although one complaint against this holding is its ambiguity, in time, the lower courts will create a common law of punitive damages that will reduce the ambiguity.' The concern we address in this and a companion article is somewhat different.' The Court treated the universe of damages as though it were divided into compensatory damages, which largely posed no problem, and punitive damages, which did pose a problem.
9 This is false. There are three types of damages:
economic compensatory damages, noneconomic compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Economic damages, such as expectational losses under a contract, are calculable by relatively objective measures.
1 " In contrast, punitive damages are not calculable by objective means, but neither are noneconomic compensatory damages. Noneconomic compensatory damages, such as pain and suffering, disfiguration, loss of consortium, or loss of enjoyment of life, are damages for which there is no good economic indicator.
Noneconomic compensatory damages are thus very similar to punitive damages in the risks that they pose for rational decision making. Moreover, now that State Farm v. Campbell has, for most the most part, precluded verdicts in punitive damages that exceed a single-digit multiplier of the compensatory damages award, one would predict that litigants would respond by searching for ways to generate the same high returns in some other way. A logical path, and one that is already beginning to be trod, is the pursuit of 6" [F] ew awards [of punitive damages] exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 605 (2003) . 7 See Mathias & Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003 ) (Judge Posner permits a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of 37.2 to 1 because of the peculiarities of the case. He notes "the defendant's behavior was outrageous but the compensable harm done was slight and at the same time difficult to quantify because a large element of it was emotional."). ' See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 605 (2003) .
"°See Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for Intangible Loss, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 359 (2006) (suggesting that intangible loss generally is more difficult to calculate than is commonly believed). noneconomic compensatory damages." Some recent cases have returned large noneconomic compensatory damage verdicts.ia Thus, State Farm v. Campbell may turn out to be less a constraint on exorbitant damages than a facilitation of the substitution of exorbitant noneconomic compensatory damage awards for exorbitant punitive damage awards, a development that obviously poses a substantial policy question.
We do not address the policy question here, however. Rather, our interest lies in the nature of noneconomic compensatory damages and the manner in which the courts historically have treated them. The courts have consistently asserted that all forms of compensatory damages entail facts," 3 yet they have also consistently asserted that juries have large discretion in finding noneconomic compensatory damages. 4 These two propositions are the subjects of our two articles. In the companion article, we examine the analytical nature of noneconomic compensatory damages and their constitutional status. 131n Cooperlndus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) , the Court held that "[a] jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiffs injury is essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation." Thus, compensatory damages are factual determinations for the jury. If this is indeed not the case, and damages are not facts, then their assessment violates the rule of law in the same fashion as punitive damage assessment, and noneconomic damages should be treated accordingly. In this article, we operate under the assumption that noneconomic compensatory damages are indeed facts and make our arguments from this basic premise.
"See note 17. appropriate starting point and the focus of this article, is the historical treatment of the matter in question.
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In this article, we present the results of our empirical inquiry into the treatment of noneconomic compensatory damages by the courts from 1800 to 1900. This period includes the founding era, the post-Civil War Reconstruction era, and the ensuing constitutional amendments. We find that, notwithstanding reiteration of the discretion that juries have over damages, the courts tightly controlled their awards of noneconomic compensatory damages. High awards were uniformly reversed, resulting in actual awards clustering fairly closely over means and medians, and there is a strong relationship between the size of the award for cases awarding noneconomic compensatory damages and the probability of reversal. Indeed, as we elaborate below, the most startling finding is that there are literally no cases affirmed on appeal prior to 1900 that plausibly involved noneconomic compensatory damages in which the total damages (noneconomic and economic combined) exceeded $450,000 in current dollars."
II. THE TREATMENT OF NONECONOMIC COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FROM 1800 TO 1900
The "great discretion" that juries have in determining damages is commented on repeatedly in the case law.'" Nonetheless, our hypothesis was that ' The Supreme Court has held that, in order to find a particular interest protected under the Due Process Clause, that interest must be one that is deeply rooted in history and tradition. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989) ("In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the Clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental' (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society. As we have put it, the Due Process Clause affords only those protections 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'") (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.)). Our cases reflect "continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.. . ." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan,J., concurring in judgment). "See, e.g., the excellent review of the cases expressing such an opinion in Brad Snyder, Protecting the Media from Excessive Damages: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Remittitur the reality of the courts' treatment of such damages would be quite at odds with their public statements about them. We formed this hypothesis largely on the basis of work done by Professor Allen on the numerous ways courts exercised control over the fact-finding process, even in the teeth of concerted political opposition designed to restrict that control.
9 From this general perspective on the nature of juridical proof, we thought it implausible that the courts would relinquish damages determinations, which comprise one of the most highly significant aspects of the fact-finding process. We decided to investigate the matter from a historical perspective by collecting historical case data. The following sections first describe the methodology for collecting the historical case data, and then use descriptive statistics to summarize the data, followed by the employment of inferential statistics to draw inferences from the data.
To foreshadow what comes, we identified a set of 1,175 cases from the period between 1800 and 1900 that involved compensatory damages. We found that: (1) cases that are reversed have higher (mean, median) total damages than cases that are affirmed; (2) cases that are reversed and claim to contain noneconomic damages have higher (mean, median) total damages than cases that are affirmed; (3) appellate courts are more likely to affirm if comparability review is employed; (4) cases that are reversed and contained a remittitur had higher (mean, median) total damages than cases that are affirmed and contained a remittitur. We use inferential statistics to show that results (1) and (2) were found to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
We then used logistic regression to determine which factors increase the probability of case reversal during the 19th century. A key finding in this model is that the size of the total damage award is positively related to the probability of reversal. Moreover, when the cases are divided into cases that contain economic damages, cases that contain noneconomic damages, and cases in which one cannot distinguish whether one or both types of damages were present, the effect of total damages in predicting rate of reversal is dramatically positive and statistically significant in cases with noneconomic and its Modem Application in Food Lion, 24 Vt. L. Rev. 299 (2000) . See also Theodore Sedgewick, On the Measure of Damages 20 (6th ed. 1874) ("The quantum of damages, being in most cases entirely blended with the questions of fact, must have been from the outset left with the jury."). damages. Finally, the practice of comparability review decreases the probability of reversal, especially in cases that contain noneconomic damages, and the practice of remittitur decreases the probability of reversal in cases where economic damages are present.
The most striking implications of our empirical study support our original hypothesis that the courts indeed kept a tight control over jury damage awards, notwithstanding the oft-stated proposition of significantjury discretion.
A. Methodology for Collecting Historical Case Data
A data set of state and federal tort cases was collected to examine the size of damage judgments generally, and noneconomic compensatory damages specifically, in the 19th century. The cases were read, entered into a database, and submitted to different tests of robustness for consistency and completeness. This resulted in a final data set of 1,175 cases for which a compensatory damage verdict was revealed in an opinion.
Steps in Compiling the Historical Case Data
We used electronic databases to compile our data set of historical cases.
2 " Using LexisNexis©, a search for the term "compensatory damages" in cases from 1800-1900 resulted in 844 cases.
21 This is labeled "Search 1" ( Table 1 , Column A). Of the 844 cases, only 578 contained a monetary damage verdict referred to in the opinion (Table 1 , Column C).
To ensure completeness, we conducted two additional searches. First, we searched using the core term "damages" and an additional core term for one of six primary causes of action in our data set. 22 We then searched using the core term "damages" and one of five prevalent types of noneconomic compensatory damages at the time (mental distress, pain and suffering, anguish, loss of reputation, loss of society).23 We matched the results from these two additional searches against the original set of 844 cases and found
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Search 2, Part 1 was compiled on Lexis using the following terms: Legal > Area of Law-By Topic > Torts > Cases > Tort > Federal & State Cases -Selected Tort Material. This search specified the date range (1800-1900), the court (state and federal), and the type of case (tort cases), and, using the Lexis "core term" feature, we searched using the core term "damages" and an additional core term for one of the six identified leading causes of action in our data set (negligence, trespass, assault, slander, libel, ejection) . According to Lexis, words selected as "core terms" are those that provide the best match between words important to the document and words important in the field of law. This resulted in the following cases: negligence (419), trespass (591), slander (249), libel (244), ejection (19), assault (200), assault and battery (122). For example, for negligence cases, we conducted this search: Search terms: core-terms (negligence) and core-terms (damages) and date(geq (01/01/1800) and leq (01/01/1900)). For completeness, we searched cases in the 18th century using the core terms feature and the cause of action and found one case for purely economic damages. 23Search 2, Part 2 was compiled on Lexis using the following terms: the core term "damages" and one of five different types of noneconomic compensatory damages (mental distress, pain and suffering, anguish, loss of reputation, loss of society), resulting in 67 cases. Running the same search on the 18th century resulted in zero cases because the "core term" feature was rarely used at the time. Even after modifying the search term from "damages" as a regular term versus a core term and combining it with each of the five different types of compensatory damages, we found 18 cases, none of which met the database criteria.
597 cases that contained a monetary damage verdict referred to in the opinion ( Table 1 , Column C). Combining the results of Searches I and 2 generated the set of 1,175 cases that involved compensatory damages. We read all 1,175 cases and collected 24 case elements for each case for inclusion in the database: (1) the case name; (2) the case citation; (3) the date decided; (4) the appellate court name; (5) the lower court name; (6) the cause of action; (7) the case facts; (8) the lower court trier (judge/jury/ can't tell); (9) whether the plaintiff won in the lower court (yes/no); (10) whether the opinion provided jury instructions on punitive damages (yes/ no); (11) whether the opinion provided jury instructions on compensatory damages (yes/no); (12) whether the lower court entered a remittitur (yes/ no); (13) the lower court actual damage verdict amount; (14) the final lower court actual verdict amount as reduced by a remittitur (if any); (15) the compensatory verdict actual damage amount (if separated from the lower court damage verdict); (16) the punitive verdict actual damage amount (if separated from the lower court damage verdict); (17) whether the case contained noneconomic damages (yes/no/can't tell); 24 (18) the appellate court holding; (19) the actual remittitur amount; (20) general notes; (21) award notes; (22) whether comparability review was present (yes/no); (23) whether the case was reversed due to the remittitur (yes/no); and (24) the reason for reversal. Finally, as another check to verify that we had collected all the relevant cases on point, we reviewed two historical articles on comparability review 25 2 4 0ur interest lies in 19th-century treatment of noneconomic damages, but it is often difficult to determine from the cases whether compensatory damages are granted for economic losses such as lost wages, or for noneconomic compensatory reasons such as mental suffering. See Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us about Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1205 (1994) (drawing attention to the unwarranted assumption that there is a "bright line" separating economic from noneconomic damage). and remittitur, 6 reading all the cases that these pieces cited. We identified nine cases cited in these articles that were not in our database that could have contained noneconomic damages. We analyzed the mean and median award for those nine cases and compared it with the mean and median for the 1,175 cases we collected. The mean in our cases exceeded the mean for the nine cases we did not collect, while the reverse is true for medians. 27 We should note that there were no high damages cases. We can conclude that the nine cases are well within the parameters of our larger subset.
B. Transposing Actual Awards into Awards in Current Dollars
Given the varying value of the currency and inflation during the time period under observation, making any comparisons among jury verdicts of the 19th century requires converting nominal verdicts to awards in current dollars. The economics literature suggests that there is no correct measure, and economic historians use one or more different series depending on the context of the question proposed. The two measures most frequently used in the literature are the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Gross Domestic Product Deflator (GDP Deflator). The CPI compares the cost of products and services that the average household buys; the GDP Deflator compares "bundles" of all goods and services produced in the economy, not just consumer goods and services that are reflected in the CPI. We selected the CPI as the deflator for the verdict amounts because it is the most popular method for making such comparisons. 28 The CPI estimates are also higher than the GDP Deflator See, e.g., Brad Snyder, The Nineteenth Century Origins of Remittitur and Its Modem Appli- Rev. 299 (2000) . Snyder cites 20 historical cases, of which four could have been included in the data set for several reasons. Howard v. Grover, 28 Me. 97 (1848), contains a damage amount that could have included noneconomic damages; however, while the case cites the terms "sufferings," "expense," and "loss of time," it does not include the primary search terms. Two libel cases, Coleman v. Southwick, 9Johns, 45 (1812), and Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613 (1827) , are not included in our data set because they do not contain any of the relevant search terms. Another case of libel, Southwick v. Stevens, 10Johns. 444 (1813) , includes the term "damages" but does not contain any terms for the leading noneconomic damages. 27 Contrast the mean and median for the nine cases found in DeCamp and Snyder, $50,896 and $31,220, with the mean and median found in our data set of 1,175 cases, $59,052 and $21,600.
2 8'he GDP was not measured before the 1930s, and thus any measure pre-1930 may not be as reliable because it relies on sources that were not collected for the purpose of constructing estimates, 29 and CPI estimates tend to overstate the cost of medical care. Thus our transposition of 19th-century awards would tend to result in overcompensation, adding a conservative bias to our results."
C. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests for the 1,175 Cases
The database of 1,175 cases spans the period of 1800-1900. The first and last tort cases mentioning compensatory damages in the printed opinions were decided in 1808 and 1900, respectively." We begin by introducing an overview of the cases and then shift the focus to a summary of the trial court damage amounts.
Overview of the Cases
As Figure 1 illustrates, the majority of the cases were tried in the latter half of the 19th century, with 57 cases tried from 1800-1850 and 1,118 cases tried from 1851-1900. The rate of reversal was relatively steady throughout the century. Trial court awards were reversed at the appellate level at a rate of 47 percent, and affirmed at a rate of 53 percent.
2 national income and product accounts. The CPI, however, provides a reasonable approximation of the modern-day worth of a sum of money from the 19th century. For earlier years, the CPI is the most useful series for comparing the cost of consumer goods and services. Although 'The CPI merely describes the central tendency in the movement of prices in an economy. Because the CPI uses average prices for a comparison, a verdict in 1850 may not be exactly as predicted.
"The cost of medical services does not increase at the rate as all goods and services. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has tracked medical care costs of all goods and services (for U.S. Cities, All Urban Consumers, Not Seasonally Adjusted). Looking at the all-goods CPI from 1957-2006 and comparing it with the medical-goods CPI shows that during this period the cost of all goods and services has increased at a significantly higher rate than the cost of medical goods.
See notes 20-22 for a discussion of the searches performed using 18th-century cases. As Table 2 shows, the seven prominent causes of action were negligence, trespass, assault, slander, libel, wrongful ejection," 3 and personal injury.1 4
One striking feature of the data set is that the 1,175 cases overwhelmingly represent lower court verdicts for the plaintiff. The 1,175 cases are mostly appellate cases, 5 tried by juries at the trial court level (95 per-"In wrongful ejection actions, typically the plaintiff was wrongfully ejected from a train some distance from the terminal in a highly dangerous situation.
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Note that while the cause of action was easily discernible from the case opinion itself and frequently recorded in the case disposition, trespass actions were difficult to classify. For example, trespass actions included "action [s] The seemingly high percentage of lower court verdicts for the plaintiff begs examination. We recognized that our original set of 1,175 cases would be biased in favor of plaintiffs' victories as our data-collection methods excluded cases in which there was no damage figure printed in the opinion; this would tend to occur in any case where the defendant won at trial. For this reason, we examined the 900 cases with no recorded damage figure in the opinion that were omitted from the empirical results of this study, drawing on a random sample from these cases to determine the plaintiff win rate. The result suggests that approximately 504 of the 900 cases without a damage amount in the opinion, or 56 percent, were lower court verdicts for the plaintiff. Using the number of plaintiff wins (1,655) and the total number of cases collected (2,075), we can infer that "The remaining 5 percent of cases were either tried byjudges (2.5 percent) or could not be classified (2.5 percent). 1 7 ln this study, "plaintiff win" is a positive amount awarded to the plaintiff. Not every plaintiff who receives a positive damage award will believe that the outcome of the jury trial has been successful. The damages awarded may sometimes be less than the attorneys or the plaintiffs aimed for, less than what they anticipated, and sometimes much less than the costs they incurred during litigation and trial. Thus "wins" in this study are being strictly defined and may at times result in unsatisfied and unhappy plaintiffs and very pleased defendants.
approximately 80 percent of the total original cases were lower court verdicts for the plaintiff." 8 The bias in our sample toward cases with damage awards raises one last methodological point we should mention. As we elaborate below, we found from our sample that damages awards in the 19th century were quite restrained, yet even these results are almost surely biased upward. Adding a number of cases with zero damages would obviously lower the means and medians of damage awards that we report and further compress the standard deviations. Even if one looks only at damages in those cases in which damages were awarded (which we think is the more pertinent question), it is hard to imagine a plausible set of circumstances in which high damages awards routinely would not be appealed, and it is easy to imagine a set of circumstances in which low damages awards routinely would not be appealed. High damages awards tend to be entered against institutional parties, such as corporations (railroads being the dominant example so far as we can tell). These parties have the resources and incentives to appeal adverse results, and did so quite successfully (thus strengthening their incentives). Low damages awards, by contrast, are equivalent to defense victories in many instances, and the cost of an appeal may easily exceed the damages. Thus, a sampling of all cases from the 19th century, rather than the reported cases that we rely on, is highly likely to generate even more constrained damages than we report. We should also mention that none of the various ways that we searched for cases turned up a high damages case that was not within our sample, thus giving us considerable confidence that, even if there are some such cases, there are relatively few of them. 198 (1997) (noting that, among other things, the use of contingency fees was perceived as necessary from a humane perspective, and allowed plaintiffs that would otherwise not have their day in court an opportunity to plead their case; for example, a socioeconomic view of 19th-century tort plaintiffs reveals that many plaintiffs could have benefited from low-cost representation). 
Trends in Trial Court Awards
The following sections provide insights into the relationships between total damages and the rate of reversal, remittitur and rate of reversal, comparability review and rate of reversal, and noneconomic damages and the rate of reversal. Descriptive and univariate statistics are used to present the results.
A more formal treatment of these items is found in Section II.D.
a. TotalDamages and Rate of Reversal. As caseloads increased over time, so did monetary verdicts, even after adjusting for inflation. Figure 2 illustrates the range of damage awards in our data set in current (2003) dollars, distinguishing between reversals (triangles) and affirmances (circles). Looking from left to right demonstrates that damage verdicts at the beginning of the century were low and gradually increased. Lower court awards ranged from $12 to $1,080,000, with a mean award of $59,052. Pre-1850 cases had a mean award of $21,278, and a median award of $11,390, while post-1850 cases had a mean award of $60,978, and a median award of $22,000. Beyond the upward trend in monetary awards, our data reveal that high damage awards rarely survived appellate review. The awards for reversed cases are larger and increasing at a higher rate than either awards for affirmed cases or awards for total cases. Table 3 displays summary statistics for all affirmed cases, all reversed cases, and all affirmed and reversed cases combined. For affirmed cases, final jury damage awards ranged from $18 to $926,250, with a mean damage award of $50,618 and a median award of $21,000. In contrast, damage amounts for reversed cases are higher, ranging from $12 to $1,080,000, with a mean damage award of $68,607 and a median award of $21,800. Figure 3 suggests that for a majority of the century, cases that were reversed had consistently higher mean and median award amounts when compared to affirmed cases. To formalize this inquiry using univariate statistics, we would like to test for differences in the mean damages for affirmed and reversed cases. However, because there is a trend in damage awards across the century and because the distribution of reversed and affirmed cases may not be equal over time, it could be that a test for mean differences isjust picking up differences in when the cases occurred. Thus, before the formal tests, we need to de-trend the data by regressing the inflation-adjusted damages on a time-trend variable.
The residuals from such a regression are the de-trended damages.
A t test for mean differences for affirmed and reversed cases can be calculated using the de-trended damages. The p value of such a test finds a significant difference in damages for affirmed and reversed cases at the 1 percent significance level. Damages are statistically higher for cases that are reversed. However, this test suffers from the fact that the data are skewed and not normally distributed (notice the large difference between the means and the medians in Table 3 ). Extreme damage awards may be driving the difference in means. Thus, we apply a second test, the Mann-Whitney test, which can be used to test nonparametrically for differences in central values of the damages by affirmed and reversed cases. The nonparametric test also rejects equivalence of affirmed and reversal damages at the 1 percent level of significance.
Both Table 3 and Figure 3 suggest that a high award is likely to be from a reversed case." Can we state at this point that an increase in the total damage award will increase the rate of case reversal? As mentioned earlier, of the 1,175 cases, 554 cases (47 percent) were reversed on appeal. Of these, 289 cases (58 percent) were reversed with "excessive damages" listed as one of the grounds for reversal. 4 Examining the high damages cases may provide insight into this question. Rev. 345, 363-364 (1931) ." 518 U.S. at 446. Both points are false. As one can tell from the data, throughout the 19th century, courts reversed jury verdicts at a very steady rate of about 47 percent, which hardly constitutes a hesitancy to reverse. Second, in cases involving noneconomic compensatory damages, the reversal rate was approximately 50 percent, and in cases involving economic damages with no noneconomic damages, the reversal rate was about 51 percent, which again hardly constitutes much of a greater reluctance to reverse noneconomic damages cases. In cases in which one cannot tell from the opinion whether noneconomic damages were awarded, the reversal rate was about 44 percent, but these cases simply do not focus on the damages question and thus do not pertain to the question at hand (and in any event the rate of reversal in this set is reasonably close to the other two). In addition, as the amount of noneconomic compensatory damages goes up, the probability of reversal goes up to essentially 1.0. By contrast, there is no relationship between the amount of economic damages and the rate of reversal. See Section D, Logistic Regression Model: Factors Determining the Rate of Reversal, infra.
'For a discussion of contemporary reasons for reversing lower court decisions, see Brian ground for reversal. Narrowing the focus to cases with more than $400,000 in damages, for these 23 cases, 17 cases (74 percent) were reversed, with 11 cases (48 percent) of these including excessiveness as grounds for reversal. There appears to be a difference between the reversal rates for cases over $200,000 and for cases over $400,000; however, this is not sufficient evidence to claim that the rate of reversal increases with an increase in damages awards. We leave the issue for later examination using multivariate methods.
b. Remittitur and Rate of Reversal. Verdicts, we found, were often not the determination of the jury alone. One way that 19th-century judges influenced the final outcomes in tort cases was by amending the jury verdict with a remittitur. When a losing defendant was dissatisfied over the amount awarded to a winning plaintiff, the defendant could seek an adjustment in hopes of minimizing the monetary loss. The judge, at his discretion, would ask for the winning plaintiff to "remit" a certain sum and, in turn, the judge would grant an affirmance instead of granting a motion for a new trial. The practice of remittitur was present in our cases. In the data set, a "lower court award" was offset by a remittitur, if any, resulting in the "final award."'" The monetary remittitur amounts were recorded in the data set. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for all cases. The first observation in Table 4 is that 10 percent of the cases in our database of 1,175 cases contain cases with remittiturs.
42 Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the 113 cases in which remittiturs were found. The minimum and maximum remittitur amounts were $57 and $420,000, respectively. Remittiturs were more common in affirmed cases compared to reversed cases. For the cases with remittiturs, the mean award varied, depending on the case disposition, with reversals reporting higher mean and median awards. The mean award for the 67 affirmed cases where a remittitur was present was $46,503, while the mean award for the 46 cases that were reversed and a remittitur was present was $75,046. Among these 46 reversals, 37 were reversed due to excessive damages notwithstanding the trial court remittitur, suggesting that 1993) . We present data below indicating that remittiturs only affect rate of reversal for cases where economic damages are present. In these cases, lower court use of remittitur makes it less likely that the case will be reversed at the appellate level.
with noneconomic damages contained remittiturs, which is equivalent to the rate of remittitur in the full data set of 1,175 cases, thus suggesting that the presence of noneconomic damages does not influence remittitur practice.
In the next section, we use multivariate analysis to examine therelationship between the use of remittitur and the rate of reversal for all cases and for a subset of cases where only noneconomic damages were present. Table 4 presents the number of cases where the appellate court employed the practice of "comparability review," or comparing the verdict amount with verdicts of other jurisdictions before deciding whether to reverse or affirm a lower court decision.
c. Comparability Review and Rate of Reversal.
Of the 1,175 cases, 7 percent used comparability review. Among the cases that contained comparability review, 59 percent were affirmed, suggesting that comparability review is positively correlated with cases that were affirmed. We will later use multivariate analysis to examine the relationship between comparability review and the rate of reversal for all cases and for a subset of cases where only noneconomic damages were present. Figure 3 and Tables 3 and 4 confirm that cases that are reversed report higher mean damage amounts than cases that are affirmed. At this point, we would like to investigate whether the added damages from the inclusion of noneconomic awards (1) contributed to larger overall damages, and (2) caused reversals to occur with a higher probability irrespective of total award amounts. As a starting point for understanding this relationship, we continued with a univariate examination of the data. We first examined the mean and median of the three damage categories coded in the data set: (1) cases where the opinion mentioned noneconomic damages in a discussion of the award ("yes"), (2) cases where the opinion did not mention noneconomic damages in a discussion of the award ("no"), and (3) cases where such a determination was inconclusive ("can't tell"). The "can't tell" category includes cases that may have contained noneconomic damages due to the nature of the injury, but such were not mentioned in the opinion. Table 4 shows that noneconomic damages are present in cases that are reversed and cases that are affirmed in almost equal proportion. However, cases that have noneconomic damages and are reversed report higher mean and median damages than cases that are affirmed. Specifically, affirmed cases that contain noneconomic damages have a mean and median of $54,050 and $22,000, respectively, while reversed cases that contain noneconomic damages have a mean and median of $106,047 and $59,400, respectively. We formulated a t test to test the difference between the mean award for affirmed and reversed cases for the 454 cases with noneconomic damages. The result was statistically significant at the 1 percent level both in the standard mean t statistic and the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test. 44 These data indicate that courts in the 19th century seemed to treat cases with noneconomic damages differently than cases without noneconomic damages. Another way to view these data is across time, rather than at a single point in time as presented in Table 4 . Figure 4 reillustrates damage awards over time as presented in Figure 3 , this time focusing on the mean and median damage awards. Figure 4 suggests that, over the century, both the mean and median awards for cases that contain noneconomic damages ("yes") are larger than the mean and median for cases that do not contain noneconomic damages ("no"). The mean and median for cases for which one cannot tell whether noneconomic damages are present ("can't tell") are 'Using the de-trended real damages data, the standard mean difference result is: two sample t (452) = 4.53, p < 0.0001. also generally larger than the mean and median for the cases that do not contain noneconomic damages. Next, we examined the relationship between noneconomic damages and case reversal. We classified the 1,175 cases into five quintiles according to the award in current dollars, with each quintile containing approximately 232 cases. As Table 5 shows, the rate of reversal for cases that contain noneconomic damages increases with damage amount, from 31 percent to 70 percent, while the rate of reversal for cases that did not contain noneconomic damages decreases (nonmonotonically) with damage amount, from 52 percent to 39 percent. Although these results suggest that the rate of reversal is higher for cases with noneconomic damages, we leave the issue for examination in the next section using multivariate methods.
d. Noneconomic Damages and Rate of Reversal.

D. Logistic Regression Model: Factors Determining the Rate of Reversal
The previous section demonstrated that reversed cases have a higher mean total damages award than cases that are affirmed, and that, for cases where only noneconomic damages are present, affirmed and reversed cases are statistically different, with reversed cases reporting higher mean damage awards. Perhaps the most interesting question, and one that was briefly examined in the previous section, is whether the rate of reversal is positively related to an increase in total damages. To determine whether this is true and, in particular, whether the rate of reversal is positively related to an increase in total damages for cases where we know that noneconomic damages are present, we need to use statistical techniques that go beyond studying the relationship between two variables. We need to examine the relationship between total damages and rate of reversal while simultaneously considering the effects of comparability review and remittitur. For this, we use multivariate (logistic regression) techniques.
We specified four logistic regression (logit) models (Models 1-4), and found strong evidence of the relationship between rate of reversal and increase in total damages, particularly where noneconomic damages were present. The dependent variable was coded 1 if the case was reversed, and 0 if the case was not reversed. Each model contained a measure of damages. A plot of the data revealed that the distribution of inflation-adjusted damages variables was not normally distributed. Since using data that are not normally distributed would violate the assumptions underlying the logistic regression, for the purpose of the regressions, we normalized the current award data using a Box Cox transformation. 45 For the sake of transparency, we provide regression results using the current award data and the Box Cox transformation data. Table 6 displays the logit results using the Box Cox transformed damages amount (Panel A), and a nontransformed damages amount (Panel B). Each model contains a variable indicating the presence of a remittitur and the presence of comparability review. These two variables are dichotomous variables coded 1 if the case contains a specified element and 0 if the case does not contain that element. All regressions also control for the seven primary causes of action: negligence, trespass, assault, slander, libel, wrongful ejection, and personal injury. A time-trend variable indicating the year that the case was decided is included to capture changes in the probability of reversal over time. The cause-of-action variables and the time-trend variable assure that our results are not capturing differences among causes of action or differences across time. Finally, each model also contains a constant term. Table 4 presents, and plots of the untransformed data confirm, that cases that are reversed and affirmed have nearly the same median, but vastly different means. The mean and median for cases that were reversed was $68,000 and $20,000, respectively; for cases that were affirmed it was $50,000 and $21,000, respectively. The skewness disappears with the transformation. 46 1n logistic regression, the constant term measures the probability of reversal when the independent variables equal zero. In our case, the constant term measures the probability of reversal when damages are zero and when there is neither comparability review nor a remittitur present. The constant term is included for convention; it will not be interpreted in this model because we never observe zero damages in our data. Model 1 used the full data set (N= 1,175) to examine the probability of reversal as a function of the level of total damages, controlling for the presence of comparability review, remittitur, seven causes of action, and time. To isolate the different effects that the presence of economic and noneconomic damages can have on the probability of reversal, Models 2-4 examined subsets of the total damages cases. Each model examined the probability of reversal as a function of the total level of damages, controlling for the presence of comparability review, remittitur, seven causes of action, and time, with Model 2 limited to the economic damages cases (N= 344), Model 3 limited to the noneconomic damages cases (N= 454), and Model 4 limited to the cases where one cannot tell if noneconomic damages are present (N= 377). To confirm that cases that contained noneconomic damages are different from cases that did not contain noneconomic damages, such that we can properly specify separate logit models, we ran a Hausman specification test on Models 2 and 3.47 The Hausman result confirms that the models are properly specified.
We use Table 6 to examine and compare the coefficient estimates for the independent variables in each of the regressions. In technical terms, the coefficient estimate is the corresponding variable's effect on the logarithm of the odds of the dependent variable, adjusting for all other variables included in the model. Simply, regression coefficients measure the predictive capability of the independent variables. Positive coefficients increase the chances that a reversal will be observed, and negative coefficients increase the chances that a reversal will not be observed. The strength of the statistical relationship is noted by an *, with *** representing the strongest statistical relationship and the absence of an * representing a weak, not statistically significant, relationship.
We focus on the transformed variable results in Panel A, noting differences with Panel B results when appropriate. Model 1 examines the rate of reversal for the full set of cases. In Model 1, the coefficient for the damages award is 0.181 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This means that a one-unit increase in the damages variable is associated with a 0.181 change in the log odds of the dependent variable (the natural log of the probability that the dependent = 1 divided by the probability that the dependent = 0). Holding other factors constant, for all cases, an increase in total damages will increase the probability of reversal. Models 2-4 are provided to 47 J. Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46 Econometrica 1251 -71 (1978 . examine the probability of reversal when the data set is divided into three subsets of cases. Here we note the principal (statistically significant) findings.
In cases where noneconomic damages are present (Model 3), damages increase the probability of a reversal. This is more pronounced in the Panel A results than in the Panel B results. Specifically, in Model 3, the coefficient for the variable total damages is 0.867 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, meaning that a one-unit increase in the independent variable is associated with a 0.867 change in the log odds of the dependent variable. The effect of total damages in predicting rate of reversal is virtually nonexistent in cases containing economic damages (Model 2), and in cases where we cannot tell if noneconomic damages are present (Model 4).
In cases where one cannot distinguish whether one or both types of damages are present (Model 4), the coefficient for total damages is not statistically significant and therefore it cannot be interpreted. This was expected. Although these cases contain the word "damages" in the opinion and cite the award 'amount, they do not generally discuss or identify the nature of the injury or relief sought. At the same time, we also thought that, if we could roughly sort the cases according to the likelihood of their containing noneconomic damages, we would find that the probability of reversal increases as damages increase in the cases that likely contain noneconomic compensatory damages.
We noted in our data a close association between punitive damages and noneconomic damages and, indeed, for intuitively obvious reasons (both are providing compensation for intangible losses). The economic damages category has 344 cases, 21 percent of which contain punitive damages. There are 454 cases in the noneconomic category, of which 44 percent have punitive damages. Meanwhile, the "can't tell" category has 377 cases, of which 35 percent contain punitive damages. If the presence of punitive damages is indicative of the presence of noneconomic damages, we predicted that the coefficient for the "can't tell" category would be positive if we controlled for punitive damages in some way. To check for this, we ran additional logit models separating cases with punitive damages from cases without punitive damages. 48 In cases where one cannot tell whether noneconomic damages are present and punitive damages are present, the coefficient is not significant so we are unable to interpret this result in any meaningful way. 49 However, while earlier results in Table 6 suggested that the presence of economic damages does not influence the probability of reversal, we find that when we consider cases with both economic and punitive damages, the case has a higher probability of reversal. For cases that contained economic damages and punitive damages, the coefficient for total damages is positive and significant at the 10 percent level."
Our explanation of the role of punitive damages suggests one final question that must be addressed. Perhaps what we are observing with the Model 3 results is driven by the court's treatment of punitive damages rather than its treatment of noneconomic compensatory damages. To test this, we ran additional logit models using the same dependent and independent variables as used in the earlier specifications and subsets of the full data set. First, we divided the group of cases containing noneconomic damages into two subsets-those with and without punitive damages-and ran two logit models. In both, the coefficient for the variable total damages was positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, as found earlier in Model 3. The relationship between increasing damages and rates of reversal was similar in the two sets, although the relationship was stronger in cases involving punitive damages." The existence of punitive damages raises the magnitude and significance of the coefficient. A case that contains both noneconomic damages and punitive damages is more likely to be reversed than if it only contained noneconomic damages. For robustness, we ran a second set of regressions. We divided the total number of cases into those cases with and without punitive damages and specified two additional logit models. In both regressions, we found that the coefficient for total damages was positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level only when 4 Within the subset of cases for which one cannot tell if noneconomic damages are present: the logit coefficient for cases with no punitive damages was -0.240 (with a z statistic of 1.22); for cases with punitive damages the coefficient was -0.149 (0.65). Both results are statistically insignificant.
5°W ithin the subset of cases that contain economic damages, the logit coefficient for cases with no punitive damages was -0.030 (with a z statistic of 0.23); for cases with punitive damages the coefficient was -0.600 (1.66) and was significant at the 10 percent level.
noneconomic damages were present. The fact that these effects disappear in the absence of noneconomic damages suggests that punitive damages alone do not increase the probability of reversal; however, they play a role in increasing the probability of reversal when noneconomic damages are present.
Two observations can be made regarding the use of comparability review and remittitur. The practice of comparability review decreases the probability of reversal in cases that contain noneconomic damages. This result is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Similarly, the practice of using a remittitur decreases the probability of reversal in cases that contain economic damages. This result is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The time trend has a negative and significant coefficient in Models 1, 2, and 4, implying that, in general, as cases approach the turn of the century, they are more likely to be affirmed than reversed. This can be said for all the cases, for cases that do not contain noneconomic damages, and for cases where one cannot tell if noneconomic damages were present. This is not true for cases that contain noneconomic damages.
The time trend is not significant in the regression containing cases with noneconomic damages.
Do cases with a particular cause of action have a higher probability of reversal? All regressions contained controls for the leading causes of action: negligence, trespass, assault, slander, libel, wrongful ejection, and personal injury. In only one regression was the coefficient for the cause of action significant. For the subset of cases where one cannot tell if noneconomic damages are present, if the case is a trespass action, it is more likely to be reversed.
Finally, the results from Table 6 can be used to plot the relationship between level of damages and the probability of reversal. Specifically, we can use the coefficients from the logit results in Panel A and plug those into the logit equation specified earlier to calculate the predicted probability of reversal for each case, for the full set 1,175, and for subsets of the full data set. The calculation is performed for Model 3, the set of cases focusing on noneconomic damages, and the result is the implied probability function of reversal as damage verdict increases, plotted in Figure 5 .
In Figure 5 , the horizontal axis represents the monetary damage award in current dollars and the vertical axis represents the probability of reversal, from 0 to 1. The circles and squares represent the 454 cases in our data set that contain noneconomic damages. This graph uses the data from the logistic regression in Panel A, Model 3, to calculate an expectation of reversal for one case based on previous cases. The result is a probability between 0 and 1. The graph demonstrates two results quite dramatically. First, as the award increases, so does the probability of reversal. Second, the probability of reversal is reduced by the presence of comparability review (the negative and statistically significant coefficient for comparability review in Model 3). The observations implicitly form two curves that illustrate this effect. The circles that form the top curve are cases where noneconomic damages are present and there is no comparability review. The top curve implies that the higher the damage award, the more likely the case is to be reversed. Verdicts approaching $1 million have a very high chance of reversal, whereas monetary damage verdicts lower than $50,000 have a less than 50 percent chance of reversal.
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52 We want to emphasize that the curves reflect the accumulating probability of reversal. We actually have one case involving high damages that was not reversed that we include in the set of noneconomic compensatories. As we discuss below, it probably did not involve noneconomic The squares forming the bottom curve are cases where noneconomic damages are present and comparability review has been used. The bottom curve shows the probability of reversal for the level of noneconomic damages when comparability review is present, suggesting that the court's practice of comparability review decreases the probability of reversal.
E. Compression of Awards
There is evidence that courts in the 19th century compressed damage awards toward the mean damage award. We can present this phenomenon visually using histograms representing the distribution of affirmed and reversed damage awards. Since an initial plot of the data revealed that the distribution of the inflation-adjusted damages variable was not normally distributed, we used a Box Cox transformation to normalize the current award data. Figure 6 uses the transformed data to illustrate two histograms-the top displays the distribution of affirmed awards and the bottom displays the distribution of reversed awards. For both affirmed and reversed cases, the gray bars represent cases with noneconomic damages and the clear bars represent the distribution of all other cases not containing noneconomic damages. Three points can be noted.
First, cases that contain noneconomic damages and are reversed have higher means-suggesting that higher damages and, in particular, those with higher noneconomic damages, are more likely to be reversed. This is a visual confirmation of the result found in Section II.D using multivariate logistic regression-namely, that cases with noneconomic damages are more likely to be reversed.
Second, the range of data in the affirmed cases in Figure 6 appears to suggest that affirmed cases are more compressed around the mean compared to reversed cases. The inference from such a statement is that when an appellate court hears a case with an extreme (high or low) lower court damage verdict, the court is more likely to reverse the case. We can perform a simple standard deviation using the original data on real damages without the trend test to confirm such a statement in a univariate setting. Similar to the simple t test for mean difference, a variance ratio test can be used to test compensatories, but we nonetheless treat it as such to be conservative. In any event, our Figure 5 should not be construed as suggesting that this one case does not exist; it is demonstrating that a priori the probability of such a case not being reversed is quite low, even though this one was not reversed. for differences in standard deviation of two groups. The standard deviation of affirmed cases is 0.0838; for reversed cases it is 0.1226. The Ftest finds that these deviations are different at the 1 percent level of confidence. Naturally, the high skew in the nontransformed data may drive these ,results. However, the standard deviations between affirmed awards and reversed awards remain statistically different both using a robust Levine variance difference test (to handle nonnormality) at the 1 percent level and using a variance ratio test of the Box Cox transformed data (as shown in Figure 6 ) at the 5 percent level. We conclude from these results that the damage awards for affirmed cases are more compressed than those for reversed cases.
Third, when we examine the standard deviation of the noneconomic cases by themselves in the affirmed and reversed cases, we find suggestive but nonconclusive evidence of compression. Both the variance ratio test and the Levine robust variance test on nontransformed data find that reversed cases have higher standard deviations. However, using the transformed data, the Box Cox variance ratio test cannot reject that the standard deviations are statistically equivalent.
Collectively, Figure 6 and the statistical tests indicate that the courts in the 19th century compressed awards to the mean. Although awards for affirmed cases are more compressed than awards for reversed cases, evidence of compression for the smaller subset of cases containing noneconomic damages is suggestive but inconclusive. The idea of compression. as a whole is an unexplored and fascinating topic warranting further investigation.
III. CONCLUSION: EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
The most telling implications of our empirical study support our original hypothesis that the courts through 1900 indeed kept a tight control overjury damage awards, notwithstanding the proposition of significant jury discretion. Perhaps the most remarkable finding is that there were only two affirmed cases prior to the 20th century in which total damages exceed $450,000 in current dollars. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that either contained much in the way of noneconomic compensatory damages. In Lake Shore & M. S. K Co. v. Rosenzweig, "3 the plaintiff was wrongfully ejected from a train some distance from the terminal in a highly dangerous situation. He was struck from behind and knocked unconscious. No other harm is mentioned in the case. In affirming the judgment, the appellate court did not mention noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering, but dwelt at length on the propriety of punitive damages. The case is thus about punitive damages rather than noneconomic compensatory damages (although we categorize it as a "can't tell" case). In the other case affirming a large verdict, Campbell v. Arbuckle, 54 the jury found a breach of a contract to marry.
Although a contract case, we include it because noneconomic compensatory damages were allowed in such cases for humiliation and so forth. In affirming the damages, the appellate court said that "it is manifest that [thejurors] have confined their verdict to actual damages only, and those, too, based upon a rather economical application of the rule of damages in this class of cases. The verdict was only four and one-half per cent., for one year, on the estate of the defendant, as he admitted it to be.
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There is thus no tort case prior to 1900 that permitted a noneconomic compensatory damages award that exceeded $450,000 in current dollars. In fact, as our discussion of Rosenzweig and Campbell points out, it is obvious that no case permitted an award of noneconomic compensatory damages anywhere near $450,000. Our figures are total damages in the cases, only one component of which is noneconomic compensatory damages, and thus they include economic compensatory damages as well. We were forced to employ total damages because the courts in the 19th century did not separate the different types of compensatory damages in their opinions. Thus, our work can best be seen as demonstrating rather low absolute limits on such damages.
There are other striking findings here. As the amount of noneconomic damages increases, so does the probability of reversal. Often, the basis of reversal is explicitly excessiveness, sometimes it is something else; in either case, it is obvious that the amount of damages influences outcomes regardless of the explicitjustifications given by the courts. As was true of the courts' refusal to give up control over juries generally, the courts during this period maintained substantial control over damage awards, keeping them remarkably in line. APPENDIX A 
